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THE ROBERTS’ COURT TAKES A SLEDGE HAMMER TO 
ASHWANDER AND CAUTIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL 







I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him; 
The evil that men do lives after them, 
The good is oft interred with their bones, 
So let it be with Caesar1
 
 
In this January’s decision of Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission,2 the Supreme Court overturned more than 100 years of 
legislative precedent,3 as well as its own precedent of twenty years,4 to 
permit corporations to spend unlimited amounts of money on direct 
advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for political office.5
 
• Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago. © 2010. 
  The 
breadth of the holding is startling.  Although the specific context 
 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR, act 3, sc. 2.   
 2. 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). 
 3. In 1907, Congress passed the Tillman Act, which was designed to prohibit corporate 
contributions to political campaigns.  34 Stat. 864, 59  Pub. Law 36 (1907); see also infra note 11.   
 4. The Court overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), 
which had held that a Michigan campaign finance act that prohibited corporations from using 
treasury money to advocate for or against political candidates did not violate the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 913.   
 5. 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). 
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considered a video-on-demand ninety minute diatribe regarding 
Presidential aspirant Hillary Clinton,6
The sweep of the decision is simply mind-boggling!  The only other 
Supreme Court decision of such broad electoral impact is Buckley v. 
Valeo,
 the plain import of the holding 
reaches all federal and state elections, presidential, congressional, 
gubernatorial, judicial, and janitorial! 
7 which sustained in large part Congress’s campaign finance 
reforms8 designed to deal with the public perception of the electoral 
shenanigans that led to the Watergate scandal.9  That was an era in 
which criminal break-ins occurred, not only into the Democratic 
National Committee headquarters, but also into Daniel Ellsberg’s 
psychiatrist’s office.10  Ellsberg had leaked the Pentagon Papers, thereby 
becoming an enemy of the administration in Washington.11  The public 
was disgusted by such high level corruption, particularly that wrought by 
invisible campaign expenditures12
 
 6. Id. at 887.   
 and political slush funds.  Congress 
 7. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 8. Id. at 23-28 
 9. Ryan Watkins, The Political Implications of 527 Organizations Necessitate Reform, 50 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 548 (2010) (citing Brandi Cherie Sablatura, Reformation of 527 
Organizations: Closing the Soft Money Loophole Created by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
of 2002, 66 LA. L. REV. 809, 818 (2006)). 
 10. On Sept. 3, 1971, the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg’s Psychiatrist, Lewis Fielding’s office, 
authorized by top Presidential Advisor John Ehrlichman, was carried out by E. Howard Hunt, G. 
Gordon Liddy and CIA agents Eugenio Martinez, Felipe de Diego, and Bernard Barker. These so 
called “Plumbers” failed to find Ellsberg’s file.  Pat Shellenbarger, Silent Witness Wrote History, 
GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Jan. 15, 2006, at A1. 
 11. Liz Halloran & Scott Michels, Curbing the Press: Why the Government Hasn’t Been This 
Antagonistic Since the Pentagon Papers Case, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, June 12, 2006.     
 12. Eight justices in Citizens United did vote to permit the requirement that corporate 
advertisements must identify the sponsor, although Justice Thomas dissented on this precise point.  
Justice Thomas has been recently quoted speaking at a law school in Florida.  In a revisionist view 
of history that would have made Cold War Soviet historians proud, he describes the initial federal 
legislation prohibiting all corporate financing of federal elections as if it were a racist conspiracy.  
Adam Liptak, A Justice Responds to Criticism From Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, at A17.  In 
fact President Teddy Roosevelt called for its adoption in his annual address to Congress in 1905: 
All contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any political 
purpose should be forbidden by law; directors should not be permitted to use 
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acted to remedy both the reality and appearance of corruption through 
campaign finance reform, hoping to restore confidence in America’s 
system of governance.13
The methodology of the Citizens United decision is just as startling 




stockholders’ money for such purposes; and, moreover, a prohibition of this kind 
would be, as far as it went, an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in 
corrupt practices acts. Not only should both the National and the several State 
Legislatures forbid any officer of a corporation from using the money of the 
corporation in or about any election, but they should also forbid such use of 
money in connection with any legislation save by the employment of counsel in 
public manner for distinctly legal services. 
  Not only is the 
holding expansive, the majority opinion fails to even cite Ashwander v. 
President Theodore Roosevelt, Annual Address to Congress (Dec. 5, 1905) (transcript available at 
http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3777).  In the preceding paragraph, Roosevelt 
repeated his call for a law regarding bribery of the electorate.  To debase Roosevelt’s message of 
anti-corruption by the unfortunate fact that the initial federal statute carries the name of a racist 
senator distorts history and is, quite frankly, dishonest and unbecoming of a Justice of the United 
States. 
The Tillman Act of January 26, 1907 provided: 
An Act to prohibit corporations from making money contributions in 
connection with political elections. Be it enacted, That it shall be unlawful for 
any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any laws of 
Congress, to make a money contribution in connection with any election to any 
political office. It shall also be unlawful for any corporation whatever to make a 
money contribution in connection with any election at which Presidential and 
Vice-Presidential electors or a Representative in Congress is to be voted for or 
any election by any State legislature of a United States Senator. Every corporation 
which shall make any contribution in violation of the foregoing provisions shall 
be subject to a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, and every officer or 
director of any corporation who shall consent to any contribution by the 
corporation in violation of the foregoing provisions shall upon conviction be 
punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand and not less than two hundred 
and fifty dollars, or by imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or both 
such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court. 
34 Stat. 864, 59  Pub. Law 36 (1907) (emphasis added). It is noteworthy that no distinction is made 
in the statute between direct contributions to a campaign and independent expenditures. 
 13. See Watkins, supra note 9.   
 14. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 908-09.   
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T.V.A.,15 a case which describes a “constitutional avoidance doctrine.”16 
Ashwander articulates a policy of avoidance of deciding constitutional 
questions, particularly broad constitutional questions, if the court can 
fairly decide the particular case before it on other grounds such as 
statutory construction, or narrower constitutional grounds.17  It is worth 
remembering that the first major declaration of unconstitutionality 
subsequent to Marbury v. Madison18 was Dred Scott v. Sanford,19 which 
moved the struggle for the rights of slaves from verbal battles in 
Congress to actual battlefields like Manassas and Gettysburg.20
 
 15. Justice Brandeis’ landmark concurrence in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,  346-48 
(1936), stated seven principles for deciding cases in which statutes are challenged on grounds that 
they might be unconstitutional. These principles are:   
  Broad 
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, 
non-adversary, proceeding . . . 2. The Court will not anticipate a question of 
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it . . . 3. The Court will 
not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise 
facts to which it is to be applied . . . 4. The Court will not pass upon a 
constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also 
present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of . . . 5. The 
Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails 
to show that he is injured by it . . . 6. The Court will not pass upon the 
constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its 
benefits . . . 7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, 
and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle 
that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly 
possible by which the question may be avoided. 
Id.  (citations, internal quotations, and footnotes omitted). 
 16. Some scholars trace the doctrine back to Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in  Murray 
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never 
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”). See 
William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions As a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL 
L.REV. 831, 837 & n. 23 (2001). 
 17. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring).   
 18. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
 19. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).   
 20. See Louise Weinberg, Dred Scott and the Crisis of 1860, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97 
(2007).  “Dred Scott may not have been a sufficient cause of the War, or the only cause, but it was a 
cause, a major cause, and in the minds of Americans then it was at the very eye of the storm.”  Id. at 
139.   
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constitutional decisions are the nuclear weapons of the judicial arsenal, 
and just as dangerous.  The Roberts five appear oblivious.  
Citizens United flatly ignores the teaching of constitutional 
modesty set forth in Ashwander.21  The decision similarly ignores the 
caution of Justice Jackson in regard to the use of the Due Process clauses 
of the U.S. Constitution: “Invalidation of a statute or an ordinance on 
due process grounds leaves ungoverned and ungovernable conduct 
which many people find objectionable.”22  A decision based on the First 
Amendment, as Citizens United is, similarly leaves conduct ungoverned 
and ungovernable by both Congress and the States.23  Constitutional 
modesty “[p]rinciples rest on more than the fussiness of judges. They 
reflect the conviction that under our constitutional system courts are not 
roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the 
Nation’s laws.”24
Instead of narrow construction, the Citizens United Court reached 
out and dealt with the case as if it presented an “unconstitutional on its 
face” attack—a ground withdrawn at the three judge district court 
level
 
25—in favor of a narrower “unconstitutional as applied” attack.26  In 
my forty years of teaching constitutional law I cannot remember another 
Supreme Court decision that did anything similar to this.27
 
 21. See 297 U.S. at 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
  In many, 
many decisions the court has converted “on the face” attacks into “as 
 22. Railway Express Agency Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 23. See id.   
 24. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-11 (1973). 
 25. Citizens United stipulated at the District Court level to dismissing Count 5 of its 
complaint, which raised a facial challenge to the act. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 892.  As the 
dissenting opinion notes, this dismissal meant that a record was not developed in the district court 
on the actual effects of the statute.  “The Court operates with a sledge hammer rather than a scapel 
when it strikes down one of Congress’ most significant efforts to regulate the way that corporations 
and unions play in electoral politics.”  Id.at 933 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 26. Id. at 892.  
 27. Even Bush v. Gore did not quite reach as far, although the “tone” may not be all that 
dissimilar. 
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applied” attacks, but never in the opposite direction.28  Facial attacks in 
First Amendment cases ordinarily require “substantial overbreadth,”29 a 
requirement first articulated in Broadrick v. Oklahoma.30
Broadrick examined a regulation involving restrictions on political 
campaign activity, an area not considered “pure speech,” and thus it 
was unnecessary to consider the proper overbreadth test when a law 
arguably reaches traditional forms of expression such as books and 
films. As we intimated in Broadrick, the requirement of 
  However, the 
Supreme Court later observed that:  
substantial 





 28. According to Marc E. Isserles: 
It is well-established that a litigant has the primary responsibility for controlling 
the contours of his or her constitutional case through the claims asserted in the 
complaint . . . [A] court should only invalidate a statute on its face if the litigant’s 
constitutional challenge can fairly be identified as a valid rule facial challenge. 
Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 
AM. U. L. REV. 359, 425-26 (1998).   
 29. Moreover, “[without] a substantial overbreadth limitation, review for overbreadth would 
be draconian indeed. It is difficult to think of a law that is utterly devoid of potential for 
unconstitutionality in some conceivable application.” Harvard Law Review Association, The First 
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, n.61 (1970). Overbreadth challenges are 
only one type of facial attack. A person whose activity may be constitutionally regulated 
nevertheless may argue that the statute under which he is convicted or regulated is invalid on its 
face. See, e. g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1949).  However, the Supreme Court 
in Terminiello was clear that that actual challenge by the petitioner was to the ordinance as 
construed and as applied to him.  Id. at 3.   
 30. 413 U.S. 601 (1973). The statute challenged in Broadrick prohibited state employees from 
soliciting or receiving political contributions, becoming a candidate for paid public office, being a 
member of a political party’s committee or of a political club, or taking part in the management or 
affairs of any political party or in any political campaign, except to express an opinion and to cast a 
vote.  Id.  The Court found it  “not a censorial statute, directed at particular groups or viewpoint . . . . 
[R]ather, [it] seeks to regulate political activity in an even-handed and neutral manner.”  In effect, 
the price of employment in the civil service of Oklahoma was curtailment of speech and action in 
the sphere of electoral politics.  Id. at 616.   
 31. New York v Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982) (sustaining a New York law criminalizing 
child pornography) (emphasis added). 
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Under this rationale, Citizens United is wrongly decided.32  Even 
Justice Black, the staunchest defender of free speech rights ever to sit on 
the Court, was sensitive to the argument that absolute speech had its 
limits.  In a biography of his father, Hugo Black, Jr. recounts that his 
father observed that a labor picket sign was “more than pure 
expression,” it was “a two by four with air holes cut in the sign.”33  “Is 
that speech?” he asked skeptically.34
In Buckley, the Court invalidated restrictions on individual, non-
coordinated expenditures to advocate the election or defeat of a 
candidate because, “[u]nlike contributions, such independent 
expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate’s 
campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive.”
  Today this might be called speech 
plus! 
35  Today, it is quite 
clear that the Buckley rationale blinks reality.  Even the underdeveloped 
record in Citizens United makes it clear that the Buckley decision 
fundamentally misunderstood the real world of election campaigning.  
Today, Members of Congress are notified about such “independent 
expenditures” made by corporations and labor unions as soon as the 
advertisements air.36  Members of Congress are particularly grateful 
when negative issue advertisements run because it allows them to run 
positive announcements and appear “above the fray.”37
 
 32. See id. at 771.  
  Today, the 
potential for both the occurrence and the appearance of corruption are 
quite obvious. Instead of time undermining the decisions that the court 
overruled in Citizens United, a good argument can be made that the 
 33. Hugo Black Jr., My Father, A Remembrance, 185 (Random House 1975). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976). 
 36. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 962 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing McConnell v. Federal 
Election Commission, 251 F.Supp.2d 176, 623 (D.D.C. 2003)).   
 37. Id.   
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underpinnings of the relevant part of Buckley have themselves been 
undermined instead.38
The dissenting justices point out three of the narrower grounds that 
could have been used by the majority, but were rejected.  These include: 
 
1. The video-on-demand feature-length film could have been 
ruled not to qualify as an “electioneering 
communication.”39
2. The court could have expanded an exemption recognized in 
an earlier case to cover non-profits that accept only a de 
minimus amount of money from for-profit corporations.
 
40
3. The court could have applied unconstitutional as-applied 
scrutiny, precisely because Citizens United resembled 
organizations the Supreme Court exempted from regulation 




There were other potential grounds available as well.  For example, 
the court considered only the application of the Federal Election 





 38. Justice Stevens’ dissent in Citizens United correctly points out that the majority opinion 
did not even attempt to suggest exceptional circumstances justifying the court reaching questions 
not presented to the court or passed on by the court below.  Id. at 960. 
  Speech prior to this limited period was unaffected, 
as was speech through alternative mechanisms such as Political Action 
 39. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 937 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The video-on-demand feature 
refers to the requirement that the ninety-minute video advocating Hillary Clinton’s defeat was to 
have been posted on a cable television site, which required payment of $1 million for the posting, 
but then viewers would have been able to see the video without charge.  Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 937-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Federal Election Commission v. 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986)).   The dissent also mentions in a footnote 
yet another ground, briefed vigorously by the National Rifle Association as amicus curiae, arguing 
that nonprofit corporate financing of electioneering communications should be permitted to the 
extent that the money can be traced back to individual contributions, a brief described as “arguing 
forcefully that this is indeed what Congress intended.”  Id. at 937 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
 42. Id. at 876.   
 STRICT SCRUTINY 105 
 
 
Allen Shoenberger, The Roberts’ Court Takes a Sledge Hammer to Ashwander 
and Cautious Constitutional Jurisprudence: Citizens United v. Federal Election 





Committees.43  The majority portrayed their decision as a blow 
liberating speech,44 although in many alternative ways the very speech 
implicated had many other places, times, and manners in which it could 
have been communicated.  Treatment of the regulations as time, place, 
and manner regulations would almost certainly have resulted in 
sustaining the regulations.45
Another alternative decision ground would have been a simple 
remand to the Federal Election Commission for further rulemaking to 
elucidate its views on video-on-demand distribution.  The majority 
opinion rejected a belated argument from Citizens United that the video-
on-demand feature precluded the film from qualifying as an election 
communication because its message would only be delivered to those 
households requesting it.
  Were that unsatisfactory, the court would 
have also had the option of invalidating various regulations, and need 
never have reached the issue of statutory constitutionality. 
46  Instead of how many people actually 
received it, the majority said the determinant factor was the number of 
subscribers who could possibly see it.47  The Court could simply have 
held this regulation unconstitutional as applied and/or vague when 
applied to video-on-demand systems—systems not explicitly discussed 
in the Federal Election Commission regulations or the associated 
commentary.48
 
 43. Id. at 887.   
 
 44. “[T]he Court cannot resolve this case on a narrower ground without chilling political 
speech, speech that is central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”  Id. at 892.    
 45. “Time, place, and manner” regulations are only subject to intermediate scrutiny, and thus 
need not be as narrowly tailored, nor be the “least restrictive means” of achieving the particular 
objective.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989).      
 46. The majority argued that Hillary was not “publicly distributed” because a video-on-
demand transmission is only sent to a requesting cable converter box.  Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 
888-89.       
 47. Id. at 889 (citing 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(b)((3)(ii) (2009)).  The entire cable system had 34.5 
million subscribers.  Indeed, as suggested below, were the video a book, it would not be covered, 
whether or not it was contained in a million-volume research library or not.   
 48. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.29 (2009). 
106 STRICT SCRUTINY  
 
 
Allen Shoenberger, The Roberts’ Court Takes a Sledge Hammer to Ashwander 
and Cautious Constitutional Jurisprudence: Citizens United v. Federal Election 





Indeed, the definition of electioneering communications excludes 
all print media, including magazines as well as electronic mail—forms 
of communication far more analogous to video-on-demand than ordinary 
broadcast media, the primary aim of the regulatory scheme.49
Finally, methodological criticism of the Citizens United decision 
might also make reference to its cavalier treatment of the Court’s recent 
decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.
  It is 
indeed ironic that the ninety-minute Hillary Clinton special could have 
been mounted on many free Internet sites and made available for 
streaming, with no payment whatsoever.  Thus, the entire point of what 
Citizens United attempted, payment of a million dollars to obtain access 
to a market for distribution, might be described by young Americans as 
an antiquarian exercise, about as reflective of modern society as the 
wind-up victrola or eight track tapes  The underlying injury in Citizens 
United seems quaint in an era of iPads, iPods, iPhones, and Blackberrys. 
50  Caperton held that Due 
Process required recusal of a judge whose election to the state supreme 
court was traceable to campaign expenditures of $3 million by a coal 
company with a pending case before the court involving a $50 million 
damage award.51  The Citizens United majority described Caperton as 
only implicating Due Process rights.52  The opinion thus sidestepped the 
practical fact that its decision in Citizens United encourages other 
litigants to do precisely the same thing, distorting the justice system by 
buying the elections of “right-thinking judges.”  Furthermore the court 
did not consider whether the Due Process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment53
 
 49. 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(c)(1). 
 might also have constitutional relevance to First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  For example, the Due Process guarantee is 
normally described as being related to fair process, and indeed, to 
justice.  What fairer process in the judicial arena can there be than judges 
who are not corrupted by an electoral system dominated by substantial 
 50. 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009). 
 51. Id.  
 52. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 910.   
 53. Caperton considered the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 STRICT SCRUTINY 107 
 
 
Allen Shoenberger, The Roberts’ Court Takes a Sledge Hammer to Ashwander 
and Cautious Constitutional Jurisprudence: Citizens United v. Federal Election 





financial interests?  Indeed, what fairer process in the legislative arena 
can there be than that achieved by an uncorrupted electoral system?  
Should the holding of Caperton not relate back quite directly to the 
ability of Congress to secure fair elections?   
One might suggest that the practical impact of Citizens United was 
not only to overrule the Court’s decisions in Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce54 and part of its decision in McConnell v. 
Federal Election Commission,55 but includes sub rosa overruling of 
Caperton itself.56
Hugo Black Jr. declares: “[I]t can be fairly said that until [Justice 
Black] was appointed to the Supreme Court and the conservative-liberal 
balance changed, that institution was used by the privileged to put the 
underprivileged back in their place.”
 
57  Is it unfair to suggest that both in 
substance and in methodology, Citizens United has restored a variant of 
governance by judicial fiat last seen from the conservative cohort of 
justices during the high water mark of substantive due process and 
Lochner v. New York?58  There is irony indeed in the fact that President 
Theodore Roosevelt called for restrictions on corporate campaign 
expenditures the very same year Lochner was decided!59
 
 54. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
  Are we 
 55. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 56. It is also worth noting that the Citizens United majority did not consider it necessary to 
justify its overruling of  previous constitutional decisions by reference to the standards for such 
overrulings.  As Justice O’Connor wrote in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey: 
Thus, for example, we may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable 
simply in defying practical workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of 
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and 
add inequity to the cost of repudiation; whether related principles of law have so 
far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned 
doctrine,  or whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as 
to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification . . . 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (citations 
omitted). 
 57. Black Jr., supra note 33 at 182. 
 58. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 59. See id; supra note 12.   
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doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past by enduring a similar cycle of 
judicial activism?  The judicial activism embodied in Citizens United 
yields no happy answer to this fearful scenario. 
